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Abstract Two word-trained dogs were presented with
acts of reference in which a human pointed, named objects,
or simultaneously did both. The question was whether
these dogs would assume co-reference of pointing and
naming and thus pick the pointed-to object. Results show
that the dogs did indeed assume co-reference of pointing
and naming in order to determine the reference of a spoken
word, but they did so only when pointing was not in con-
ﬂict with their previous word knowledge. When pointing
and a spoken word conﬂicted, the dogs preferentially fet-
ched the object by name. This is not surprising since they
are trained to fetch objects by name. However, interest-
ingly, in these conﬂict conditions, the dogs fetched the
named objects only after they had initially approached the
pointed-to object. We suggest that this shows that the
word-trained dogs interpret pointing as a spatial directive,
which they integrate into the fetching game, presumably
assuming that pointing is relevant to ﬁnding the requested
object.
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How two word-trained dogs integrate pointing
and naming
Some nonhuman individuals are able to comprehend
human symbols in the sense that they respond to them in
human-like ways. The best known are individual linguistic
apes, who acquire receptive vocabularies of several hun-
dred ‘‘words’’ (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993).
However, chimpanzees (and other great apes) seem not to
understand pointing (see Call and Tomasello 2005 for a
review). However, recent studies suggest that at least
chimpanzees have some sensitivity to pointing and show it
when methods used for testing and their environments are
changed (Lyn et al. 2010). Furthermore, trained individuals
from other species also understand pointing (Herman et al.
1999; Miklo ´si and Soproni 2006). However, domestic dogs
(as a species) seem to be special, in that they seem to be
very good at understanding pointing (see Miklo ´si and
Soproni 2006 for a review). Individual domestic dogs have
also been trained to comprehend spoken object labels
(more than 1000 in one case) (cf., Kaminski et al. 2004;
Pilley and Reid 2011). These dogs seem to understand the
human use of object labels in some sense referentially, as
they fetch designated objects by their labels.
Two of the word-trained dogs (Rico and Chaser) were
able to infer referents of novel labels by exclusion. That is,
when Rico was asked to fetch Sirikid (a novel word for the
dog) from a set that comprised several familiar objects and
one unknown object, Rico correctly identiﬁed the novel
object as the referent of the novel label (Kaminski et al.
2004, see also Pilley and Reid 2011). Since word learning
by exclusion in human children is considered to rely either
on sophisticated inferences about speakers’ communicative
intentions (e.g., Clark 1990; Diesendruck and Markson
2001) or on speciﬁc word learning mechanisms (Markman
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DOI 10.1007/s10071-012-0494-x1989; Merriman and Bowman 1989), Kaminski et al.’s
(2004) original ﬁndings led to a debate as to whether and
how dogs’ label repertoire is similar to human vocabularies
with respect to these dogs’ understanding of reference. For
dogs, Markman and Abelev (2004) suggest that neophilia, a
low-level process, rather than understanding of communi-
cative intentions accounts for referent resolution by
exclusion.
Some developmental psychologists argue that word-
trained dogs’ skills with object labels are very different
from a human understanding of reference (Markman and
Abelev 2004; Bloom 2004). For example, Bloom (2004)
pointed out that for children, object labels are symbols that
can be used for a certain kind of object (a category) in a
variety of different contexts. For dogs, however, he argues
that object labels may be nothing more than highly speciﬁc
commands to fetch particular objects. In response to that,
Pilley and Reid (2011) showed that Chaser, a word-trained
Border collie, can perform actions other than fetching with
named objects. This suggests that Chaser might indeed
understand that labels like ‘‘ball’’ are not speciﬁc fetching
commands but refer to objects. However, one could argue
that Chaser may have merely learned complex action
commands (e.g., ‘‘take ball’’ and ‘‘nose ball’’) during
training. That is to say, it is not clear from Pilley and
Reid’s study whether Chaser really separated the object
label from the action label and thus understands the dif-
ferent functions.
Markman and Abelev (2004) raised another point
against the view that word-trained dogs understand object
labels referentially: They argue that dogs’ correct identi-
ﬁcation of referents of words might not reﬂect the dogs’
understanding of human’s referential intentions, but rather
be a conditioned response. They suggest that a demon-
stration is needed that dogs are able to understand humans’
referential intentions. Such understanding of referential
intentions is required in object choice task when study
participants have to ﬁgure out what a human wants them to
fetch. A recent study by Kaminski et al. (2009) suggests
that word-trained dogs may be able to read referential
intention: It was found that, without previous training, dogs
used replicas in order to fetch objects as desired by a
human. Thus, these dogs show some understanding of the
referential/symbolic function of human communicative
signs.
Referential understanding (as developmental psycholo-
gists study it) includes understanding of the co-reference of
various aspects of a multimodal referring expression, for
example, when a mother points to an object for her baby
and says, ‘‘look, that is a ball.’’ (cf., Koenig and Echols
2003). In human communication, both pointing and object
labels can be used referentially. Human infants understand
communicative intentions expressed in pointing gestures
even prelinguistically (Behne et al. 2005). Further, in
Western cultures, parents often point at objects and name
them for their children (Masur 1997).
Importantly, and in sharp contrast to other animals, by
the time human children comprehend pointing, they also
start producing it for various functions (Liszkowski et al.
2007; Tomasello et al. 2007) and caretakers often respond
to children’s pointing by naming the pointed-to objects
(Hannan 1992). So it is not surprising that from the outset
of word learning, children know and expect that pointing
and object labels co-refer and thus express a single
coherent referential intention. That is, when an adult points
to an object, infants as young as 13 months of age expect
that the word she is saying is the object’s name (Gliga and
Csibra 2009). This expectation is the core of referential
understanding in children.
Interestingly, Grassmann and Tomasello (2010) dem-
onstrated that when a speaker points to one object and
simultaneously uses an object label, children assume that
the pointed-to object is the object she intended to refer to,
even when the spoken word was not the name the child
would expect to hear for the pointed-to object. For exam-
ple, when the adult verbally requested ‘‘the car’’ while
pointing to a novel object, young children handed the adult
the novel object. On the basis of the children’s object
selection in various conﬂict conditions, Grassmann and
Tomasello argue that children do not ignore the spoken
object label but integrate the current use of the spoken
word with their previous word knowledge. For example,
they probably assume that the novel object is a car. Simi-
larly, when the adult pointed at a car and verbally named it
‘‘the modi’’ (a novel word), children inferred that the
speaker meant to refer to the car and that ‘‘modi’’ was
probably a superordinate term (cf., Liittschwager and
Markman 1994; Mervis et al. 1994).
We suggest that investigating word-trained dogs’ inter-
pretation of bimodal referential expressions in which
pointing and object labels are used simultaneously would
provide a good test case as to whether they understand
human referential intentions in a manner similar to
humans. The current study therefore asks whether word-
trained dogs integrate their understanding of the pointing
gesture (which they share with other dogs) with interpret-
ing the reference of spoken words (in the fetching game).
In three conditions, we assessed (1) whether word-trained
dogs use the pointing gesture in order to disambiguate the
reference of a novel word between two novel objects
(Ostensive Naming condition), and (2) how word-trained
dogs interpret a referential act in which the speaker is using
a novel word while pointing to an object for which the dog
had learned another label. In other words, would dogs
allow multiple names for one object (Novel Label Con-
ﬂict)? (3) How word-trained dogs respond to a speakers’
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pointing to a novel object. In other words, do dogs accept
more than one referent per label without extensive asso-
ciative training (Familiar Label Conﬂict)?
In order to establish baselines for dogs’ interpretation of
pointing, familiar words, and novel words in isolation,
three further conditions were conducted: a Pointing Base-
line, in which no novel word was used, a Familiar Label
Baseline, in which the dogs were simply tested for their
vocabulary, and a Mutual Exclusivity condition, in which
we assessed reference resolution by exclusion. Since we
were interested in dogs’ inferential skills about human
referential expressions, retention of novel label-object
mappings was not tested.
We hypothesized that if the word-trained dogs were
able to fetch objects based on pointing in the Pointing
Baseline (a cue the owners do not use in the fetching
game) and if they were also able to rely on the pointing
gesture in order to disambiguate a speaker’s reference
between two novel objects, then this would provide initial
evidence for dogs’ sophisticated skills in integrating
multimodal communication. This would be a prerequisite
to integrating pointing and naming in a similar manner to
how human children integrated them in the conﬂict con-
ditions. In this case, the dogs should fetch the pointed-to
object. Alternatively, the dogs may preferably rely on
words and not integrate words and gesture to a single
interpretation when the two seemingly contradict one
another, simply because they have been trained to obey to
words in the fetching game.
Methods
Participants
Two Border collies (1 male, age 8 year; 1 female, age
9 year) participated in this study. Both dogs were family
dogs that lived as pets with their owners and were expe-
rienced in fetching objects by their labels. Paddy knew
labels for approximately 60 objects, and Betsy knew 300
object labels at the time they were tested. Both dogs play
the fetching-objects-by-name game one to 2 h per week
with their owners. Betsy is introduced to novel objects and
labels on an irregular basis (birthday gifts, gifts brought by
visitors). Her word training was done in a ritual manner;
ﬁrst, the owner tells the dog that there will be a new toy.
Then, the novel object is presented together with the novel
name. Then, the new object is thrown, and the owner uses
the novel word in her command to the dog to fetch the
object. Paddy receives one or two new objects each month.
His word training is similar to Betsy’s: First, the object is
presented to the dog, the name is given, then the object is
handed to the dog for exploration, then it is hidden or
thrown away, and Paddy is asked to fetch it.
Materials and design
We examined the dogs’ object choice in six conditions: two
baseline conditions (Pointing Baseline, Familiar Label
Baseline) and four experimental conditions: two conﬂict
conditions (Familiar Label Conﬂict condition and Novel
Label Conﬂict condition) and two nonconﬂict conditions
(Mutual Exclusivity, Ostensive Naming). The dogs
received 12 trials in each of the four experimental condi-
tions. The experimental conditions were presented in three
blocks of four to six trials. In each session, the dogs
received one to three blocks of different conditions with the
order of the blocks counterbalanced across sessions. The
Ostensive Naming Condition was assessed 2 years after
initial data collection in two and three sessions, respec-
tively.
1 The Familiar Label Baseline and the Pointing
Baseline served as ﬁllers.
For each of the experimental trials, a set of six objects
was created. For the Ostensive Naming Condition, the set
comprised four familiar and two novel objects. For all
other experimental conditions, the sets comprised ﬁve
familiar and one novel object. The familiar objects were
randomly chosen from the dogs’ own toys. The novel
objects were pets’ or children’s toys for which the owner
conﬁrmed prior to the study that they were novel for their
dog. For each of these sets, the dogs were successively
asked to fetch three objects (without replacement of
selected toys): one request in the Pointing Baseline, one
request in the Familiar Label Baseline, and one request in
an experimental condition. The order of requests was such
that the experimental condition was preceded by either the
Pointing Baseline or the Familiar Label Baseline 50 % of
the time. In addition, the experimental condition was pre-
sented either second or third for each set of toys.
The novel labels used in the Mutual Exclusivity Con-
dition, the Ostensive Naming Condition, and the Novel
Label Conﬂict Condition were suggested by the owner.
Each novel object was used only once in the entire study,
but familiar objects that served as distractors were allowed
to occur more than once.
Procedure
The testing took place in the dog owners’ homes. For each
trial, six objects were placed in a row on the ﬂoor with
30-cm space between neighboring toys (see Fig. 1). The
dog sat approximately 2 m away. Betsy was tested in one
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this
manuscript for suggesting this manipulation.
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123room. Her owner held her in the starting position and looked
down during the whole trial. For Paddy, two adjacent rooms
were used. The objects were placed in one room, and Paddy
waitedinthedoorway tothe adjacent roomfortherequestto
fetchanobject.Then,theexperimenteraskedthedogtofetch
an object—according to condition, different cues were pro-
vided. Afterthedogpickedoneobject, he/shewasrequested
to bring it to the owner (Betsy) or to an assistant in the
adjacent room (Paddy). The owner and the assistant gave
only neutral responses to the dog’s selection, that is, they
neverpraisedthedogirrespective ofthedog’schoices.They
took the toy from the dog and placed it aside, and the next
request started. The dog owners, who were blind to experi-
mental conditions, signaled to the experimenter if they
thought that their dog was getting tired. In this case, the
session was terminated and continued later in the day or the
next day. The position of the novel object was counterbal-
anced across trials (with the restriction that the novel object
was never in the rightmost or leftmost position of the row).
After the three requests, all remaining objects were cleared
away, and the next set of six objects was placed on the ﬂoor.
Pointing Baseline
In this condition, the experimenter requested a familiar
object by pointing to it (proximal pointing—ca. 10 cm
between ﬁnger and object). The experimenter always poin-
ted with an extended arm, leaning her body also toward the
indicated object. This was necessary in order to make
pointing to the objects in the middle of the row of objects
identicaltopointingtoobjectsplaced totheedgesoftherow
of objects. The pointing gesture was accompanied by the
verbal request ‘‘Fetch it.’’ The verbal request was repeated
twice,andthepointinggestureremaineduntilthedogmadea
choice. Throughout the trial, the experimenter altered her
gaze between the dog and the pointed-to object.
Familiar Label Baseline
The experimenter asked the dog to select a familiar object
(e.g., ‘‘Fetch the car.’’). The familiar word was repeated
twice. Throughout the trial, the experimenter looked
straight to the dog.
Ostensive Naming
The experimenter pointed to one of the two novel objects
that were positioned next to one another and said, for
example, ‘‘Fetch the blicket.’’ The novel word was repeated
twice.
Mutual Exclusivity
The experimenter asked the dog to ﬁnd the referent of a
novel word, for example, ‘‘Fetch the modi.’’ The novel
word was repeated twice.
Familiar Label Conﬂict
As in the Familiar Label Baseline, the experimenter
requested a familiar object by saying its label two times
(e.g., ‘‘Fetch the car.’’). Additionally and simultaneously,
she pointed to the novel object and alternated her gaze
between the dog and the pointed-to object.
Novel Label Conﬂict
This condition is the reverse of the Familiar Label Conﬂict:
The experimenter asked the dog, ‘‘Fetch the toma’’ and
simultaneously pointed to a familiar object that was posi-
tioned next to the novel object. The novel word was
repeated twice.
Ifthedogsdidnotpickanobject,therequestwasrepeated
once. Sometimes, a dog fetched the novel object from a set
beforeitwasatarget.Inthiscase,anewsetofsixobjectswas
Fetch it! 
dog 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 N
Exp 
Fetch F2! 
dog 
F1 F2 F3 F5 N
Exp 
Fetch F5! 
dog 
F1 F3 F5 N
Exp 
Fig. 1 Example of the order of three object requests (one request in
each of the two baseline conditions and one request in an
experimental condition) for one set of ﬁve familiar (F1–F5) and one
novel object (N)
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each dog). This procedure resulted in different numbers of
trials. In particular, the number of trials in the experimental
conditions varied between 10 and 12, and the number of
baseline trials varied between 43 and 54 (see Table 1).
Coding and reliability
We scored the dogs’ ﬁrst touch/approach and their object
selection(fetching).Firsttouchwascodedfortheobjectthat
the dog ﬁrst considered by touching it with the nose. Object
selection was coded as the object the dog picked up in order
to bring it to the owner, the experimenter, or an assistant. A
second independent coder coded a randomly selected set of
nine trials from each dog from videotape for reliability. The
ﬁrst and the second coding indicated excellent reliability
both for ﬁrst touch (Paddy: Cohen’s Kappa = 0.96, Betsy:
Cohen’s Kappa = 0.86) and for selection (Paddy: Cohen’s
Kappa = 0.98 Betsy: Cohen’s Kappa = 1).
Results
For purposes of statistical analyses, the dependent mea-
sures were how often the dogs 1) ﬁrst touched and 2)
selected the pointed-to or the labeled object.
Statistical analysis
The dogs’ behavior was compared to chance level by using a
Monte Carlo manipulations (Adams and Anthony 1996;
Manly 1997). These simulations were employed in order to
simulate random object selection for each condition by con-
trolling for different chance values resulting from not
replacing fetched items to sets.
2 The simulation repeated
random object selection for each condition 10,000 times and
thereby generated a frequency distribution for simulated
(random) number of correct object selection for each condi-
tion.Themeanofthatsimulatedfrequencydistributionserved
asthechance-levelvalue.Thepvalueforthecomparisonofa
dog’sobjectselectionagainstchanceinaparticularcondition
was determined as the proportion of simulated object selec-
tions in which the number of correct object selection was as
high as or higher than that of dog’s actual object selection.
Object selection
The dogs’ object selection responses in all conditions are
given in Table 1. Statistical analyses comparing the dogs’
Table 1 Number of object retrievals consistent with the label and the pointing gesture in all conditions
Object selection
Labeled object Pointed-to object Next to pointed-to object
a Other
Paddy
Pointing Baseline (N = 43) 22 (51 %)*** 7 (16 %) 14 (33 %)
Familiar Label Baseline (N = 47) 42 (89 %)*** 5 (11 %)
Mutual Exclusivity (N = 12) 10 (83 %)*** 2 (17 %)
Ostensive Naming (N = 12) 9 (75 %)*** 3 (25 %)
b
Familiar Label Conﬂict (N = 10) 7 (70 %)** 2 (20 %) 1 (10 %)
Novel Label Conﬂict (N = 12) 7 (58 %)** 1 (8 %) 4 (34 %)
Betsy
Pointing Baseline (N = 42)
N = 54
19 (35 %)** 6 (11 %) 29 (54 %)
Familiar Label Baseline (N = 46) 43 (94 %)*** 3 (6 %)
Mutual Exclusivity (N = 11) 2 (18 %) 9 (82 %)
Ostensive Naming (N = 12) 7 (58 %)** 4 (34 %)
c 1( 8% )
Familiar Label Conﬂict (N = 12) 8 (67 %)** 4 (33 %)
Novel Label Conﬂict (N = 11) 6 (55 %)* 3 (27 %) 2 (18 %)
Asterisks indicate performance signiﬁcantly above chance level. Cells are blank when this option was not available in a condition * p\0.05;
** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
a Next to pointed-to object is the labeled object in conﬂict conditions (except for one case for Paddy in the Novel Label Conﬂict condition)
b 2 times the novel object next to the pointed-to novel object, 1 time the familiar object on the other side
c 3 times the novel object next to the pointed-to object, 1 time the familiar object on the other side
2 For example, in the Novel Label Baseline, Paddy got 7 trials with a
chance probability of 0.2 (object selection out of 5 available objects)
and 5 trials with a chance probability of 0.25 (object selection out of 4
available objects).
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performance with familiar spoken words. Both dogs chose
the labeled object above chance level in all conditions in
which a familiar label was used. Additionally, Paddy but
not Betsy was also able to identify the referent of a novel
word in the Novel Label Baseline. Both dogs chose the
pointed-to object at above chance levels but nevertheless at
a surprisingly low level. A comparison of the two baselines
revealed that both dogs chose the requested object more
reliably in the Familiar Label Baseline than in the Pointing
Baseline (Paddy: v
2 = 15.95, df = 1, p\0.001, Betsy:
v
2 = 35.827, df = 1, p\0.001). Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that in the conﬂict conditions both dogs chose the
labeled object at above chance level but chose the pointed-
to object only at chance level.
Since most studies employing object choice in order to
test dogs’ understanding of pointing use ﬁrst approach
behavior, we ran a second set of analyses based on the
dogs’ ﬁrst touch rather than their fetching.
First touch
The dogs’ ﬁrst touch responses in all conditions are given
in Table 2. Paddy approached the labeled object at above
chance level in all conditions where a label was available
except in the Novel Label Conﬂict condition. Furthermore,
Paddy also approached the pointed-to object at above
chance level in all conditions in which a pointing gesture
was available. The analysis of Betsy’s ﬁrst touch behavior
revealed that she followed the label at above chance level
in all conditions in which a familiar word was used. Fur-
thermore, she approached the pointed-to object at above
chance levels when no familiar label was available. A
comparison of the two baselines revealed that both dogs
approached the requested object equally in the Pointing
Baseline and in the Familiar Label Baseline. Thus, the
dogs’ responses in the conﬂict conditions indicate that
pointing is important in guiding the dogs’ ﬁrst touch.
Nevertheless, the relatively low proportion of correct ref-
erent identiﬁcation in the Pointing Baseline remains sur-
prising. It may be worth noting that both dogs approached
or fetched objects that were positioned next to the pointed-
to object relatively frequently in the Pointing Baseline
(Paddy: 16 % in selection, 9 % in ﬁrst touch; Betsy: 11 %
in selection, 17 % in ﬁrst touch).
Comparisons of ﬁrst touch and selection
For each condition, the dogs’ ﬁrst touch behavior was
compared to their object selection by using McNemar chi-
square tests. In the Familiar Label Baseline, both dogs’
response was better at selection than at ﬁrst touch (both
dogs p\0.001). Interestingly, in the Pointing Baseline,
Betsy was better at her ﬁrst approach than at her eventual
Table 2 Number of ﬁrst approaches consistent with the label and the pointing gesture in all conditions
First touch
Labeled object Pointed-to object Next to pointed-to object
a Other
Paddy
Pointing Baseline (N = 43) 20 (47 %)*** 4 (9 %) 19 (44 %)
Familiar Label Baseline (N = 47) 21 (45 %)*** 26 (55 %)
Mutual Exclusivity (N = 12) 6 (50 %)* 6 (50 %)
Ostensive Naming (N = 12) 12 (100 %)***
Familiar Label Conﬂict (N = 10) 5 (50 %)* 5 (50 %)*
Novel Label Conﬂict (N = 12) 4 (33 %) 8 (67 %)**
Betsy
Pointing Baseline (N = 54) 32 (59 %)*** 9 (17 %) 13 (24 %)
Familiar Label Baseline (N = 46) 26 (57 %)*** 20 (43 %)
Mutual Exclusivity (N = 11) 3 (27 %) 8 (73 %)
Ostensive Naming (N = 12) 9 (75 %)*** 3 (25 %)
b
Familiar Label Conﬂict (N = 12) 6 (50 %)* 4 (34 %) 2 (18 %)
Novel Label Conﬂict (N = 11) 2 (18 %) 9 (82 %)*
Asterisks indicate performance signiﬁcantly above chance level. Cells are blank when this option was not available in a condition * p\0.05;
** p\0.01; *** p\0.001
a Next to pointed-to object is the labeled object in conﬂict conditions
b 2 times novel object, 1 time familiar object
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pointing was equal at ﬁrst touch and selection.
Discussion
Both dogs in the current study were skillful in fetching
familiar objects requested by an unfamiliar person in a
fetching game. Both dogs successfully picked objects
indicated by pointing or familiar labels. The dogs also
relied on pointing in order to disambiguate the reference of
a novel label in the Ostensive Naming Condition. In the
conﬂict conditions, however, when pointing was in conﬂict
with a label, both dogs fetched the labeled object. Inter-
estingly, the dogs did so only after having ﬁrst approached
the pointed-to object. One of the dogs (Paddy) was also
able to identify the referent of novel object labels by
exclusion. Interestingly, the other dog (Betsy) failed to do
so. Betsy’s performance in the Mutual Exclusivity condi-
tion contradicts claims that neophilia might cause exclu-
sion phenomena in word-trained dogs (cf., Markman and
Abelev 2004; Kaulfuß and Mills 2008).
Overall, the dogs’ responses in the conditions where
pointing and labeling occurred together (whether in a
conﬂicting manner or in a disambiguating manner) indicate
that the dogs attended to pointing and integrated it into the
fetching context. This is interesting since the dogs had been
trained to fetch objects by name, and thus, arguably, object
labels are the most relevant information for the dogs in the
fetching game. The importance of object labels is also
shown be the fact that both dogs chose the target referent
more reliably in the Familiar Label Baseline than in the
Pointing Baseline. Despite their training, however, the dogs
used pointing in the fetching game, and this may indicate
that they understand something about their interlocutor’s
referential intentions.
Therefore, the main question for discussion is: Why did
the dogs attend to the pointing gesture in the conﬂict con-
ditions where they could have ignored the pointing? And
why did they do it in the way that they did: ﬁrst approaching
the pointed-to object but then not fetching it? We suggest
that the clue for the answer to that question lies in the fact
that in the conﬂict conditions the named object was always
positioned next to the pointed-to object. This made pointing
helpful for the dogs in ﬁnding the named object among a set
of four or ﬁve objects. One reason for the dogs following the
point could be that movement of the human toward an
object is highly salient to dogs and leads them to walk in the
indicated direction.
3 Another reason for the dogs following
the pointing gesture might be that the (visual) information
that is available to them from 2-m distance is not sufﬁcient
to identify the referent of a spoken word. Thus, the dogs’
initial approaches to the pointed-to object might reﬂect their
attempt to gain additional information about where to ﬁnd
the requested object. Especially interesting in this respect is
Betsy’s object selection in the Novel Label Conﬂict: In this
condition, Betsy fetched the labeled object (according to
exclusion inferences) at above chance level. However, in
the Mutual Exclusivity condition, she was not successful
with this inference. Thus, it seems as if Betsy needed the
speaker’s hint that the requested object is to be found in a
certain area of the choice set.
This line of thinking would suggest that the word-
trained dogs do integrate the experimenter’s pointing and
naming, but they do not understand pointing as indicating a
speciﬁc location or object, but as something a bit looser: a
spatial cue that leads them to walk in the indicated direc-
tion. Such an understanding would enable them to ﬁnd a
desired object or piece of food in most studies on dogs’
point comprehension. A similar point has been made by
researchers suggesting that dogs may interpret pointing as
some kind of directive ordering them where to go instead
of informing them about/referring to objects in the vicinity
(Kaminski 2008; Scheider et al. 2011; Topa ´l et al. 2009;
Wobber and Kaminski 2011). Spoken labels, on the other
hand, are directly mapped to individual objects through the
dogs’ word training. Thus, pointing and words work dif-
ferently for word-trained dogs. Note that for humans,
however, pointing and words are both referential, that is,
object-related (see Topa ´l et al. 2009 for a discussion of a
similar point how human communicative signals differ for
dogs and children).
The fact that the dogs’ object choice in the conﬂict
conditions is in sharp contrast to what children as young as
2 years of age (who also have vocabularies of on average
50–500 words, Fenson et al. 1994) do might be related to
that difference in how pointing and words work for word-
trained dogs versus children. For example, in a recent
series of similar studies, Grassmann and Tomasello (2010)
demonstrated that young children integrate pointing and
object labels in a different manner than the dogs in the
current study did. In particular, the children relied on the
pointing gesture when pointing and naming conﬂicted.
Thus, they accepted new exemplars for known words
(Familiar Label Conﬂict) and second labels for known
objects (Novel Label Conﬂict). However, this difference in
behavior does not mean that the word-trained dogs fail to
understand the communicative intention of the speaker.
One must not overlook an important difference in experi-
ence with pointing and labeling between the word-trained
dogs from the current study and children. As stated above,
for children, pointing and words go together from the
beginning of referential communication (Carpenter et al.
1998; Gliga and Csibra 2009), and mothers in Western
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
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123cultures often name objects they point at for their children
(Masur 1997). The owners of the dogs in our study report
that they do not use pointing in their word training and this
might explain the different responses found for children
(Grassmann and Tomasello 2010) and the dogs in the
current study. Interestingly, Pilley and Reid (2011) report
that they used pointing when introducing new labels for
Chaser. Thus, Chaser’s experience with pointing and
naming might be more similar to children’s experience,
and thus, Chaser might be more likely to fetch the pointed-
to object in the conﬂict conditions. In addition, since
Chaser has one-to-many mappings in his vocabulary, he
might be less ‘‘strict’’ in choosing the labeled object in the
conﬂict conditions.
The current study is thus a ﬁrst step toward an under-
standing of how nature and nurture interact in the develop-
ment of an understanding of reference and communicative
intentions in dogs. Future research needs to investigate how
pet dogs in general (not only the highly trained dogs) inte-
grate verbal and gestural information in order to make more
general conclusions about how dogs integrate these two
modalities of human communication.
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